On 26 November 2019 at or about 1.20 pm, a clerical staff in HSBC Bank was instructed by a Manager named Ms. Alice Goh to hand over information related to the Bank’s system and the clerk’s computer ID to the system to her immediately.
The clerk told her that it was wrong and asked for some time to get clarification about giving the confidential information to her and to reply to her email.
Ms. Alice Goh suddenly snatched the clerk’s computer mouse to access the clerk’s computer system.
Out of shock, the clerk spontaneously turned off the switch as the clerk thought that Ms. Alice Goh's was wrong.
Miss Alice Goh then raised her voice and threatened the clerk by saying “I am your manager and if you are not giving work require information, I will escalate this to HR to take action against you” before walking off from the clerk’s workplace.
Accessing another worker’s computer system and sharing of ID is an act strictly prohibited in the banking industry. Such actions are a violation of the Information Technology procedures and policies in every bank.
This Manager has clearly flaunted and abused the powers vested with her. This abuse of power related to access to customers’ information and the clerk’s personal access ID must not be viewed in isolation. NUBE believes that HSBC’s moves to export jobs currently performed by its Malaysian workers in HSBC Head Office in Kuala Lumpur to Hyderabad in India, Sri Lanka and other vendors in Cyberjaya must also be looked at in terms of the possible breach of confidential information that would be accessible to these foreign workers .
NUBE calls on HSBC to clarify and disclose exactly what sort of information would be accessible to the foreign workers who will be taking over the jobs of the current Malaysian workers. In the meantime, NUBE calls upon HSBC to halt this outsourcing of jobs until there is some clarity as to what and how this scheme would be implemented and what level of disclosure of information is involved.